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ABSTRACT
This article extends the debate on grounded theory method (GTM)
commenced by Bryant (2002). It discusses the charges of ‘phenomenalism’ and
‘naïve inductionism’, that Bryant levels at GTM, and asks if they are fair
criticism of the method, or reinforcing prejudices about GTM that might hinder
its take up in the field of information systems research. In particular, the article
considers the idea of the researcher using GTM as a ‘blank slate’ with no
preconceptions, and finds this idea not to be supported in the GTM literature.
The central paradox of GTM, as a subjective coding process which also claims to
systematic is also discussed. The article concludes with some suggestions for IS
researchers using GTM, and also questions how much GTM is actually used for
theory generation in IS.

INTRODUCTION
Grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss
1967) has been increasingly used by
qualitative researchers in the information
systems discipline in recent years.
The
Discovery of Grounded Theory (Glaser and
Strauss 1967) was seen as quite revolutionary
at the time. This book outlined a research
methodology that aimed to systematically
derive theories of human behaviour from
empirical data and was also a reaction to
‘armchair’ functionalist theories in sociology
of the time (Kendall 1999, Dey 1999). As

Bryant points out, it is useful to discuss
Grounded Theory Method (GTM) in order to
distinguish the process of generating grounded
theory (the method) from its objective, a
‘grounded’ theory about a particular
phenomena, so called because the theory has a
very close tie to the data and therefore can be
‘grounded’ in the data. After its inception in
1967, GTM spread fairly quickly as an
accepted
qualitative
research
method,
particularly in the health field. There were
several more books and articles by the cooriginators which
developed, and later,
debated the method (Glaser & Strauss 1967,
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Table 1 Key Characteristics of Grounded Theory Method (Cresswell 1998)
1
2

The aim of grounded theory is to generate or discover a theory.
The researcher has to set aside theoretical ideas to allow a ‘substantive’ theory to
emerge.
3 Theory focuses on how individuals interact in relation to the phenomenon under study.
4 Theory asserts a plausible relation between concepts and sets of concepts.
5 Theory is derived from data acquired through fieldwork interviews, observations and
documents.
6 Data analysis is systematic and begins as soon as data is available.
7 Data analysis proceeds through identifying categories and connecting them.
8 Further data collection (or sampling) is based on emerging concepts.
9 These concepts are developed through constant comparison with additional data.
10 Data collection can stop when no new conceptualisations emerge.
11 Data analysis proceeds from ‘open’ coding (identifying categories, properties and
dimensions) through ‘axial’ coding (examining conditions, strategies and
consequences) to ‘selective’ coding around an emerging storyline.
12 The resulting theory can be reported in a narrative framework or as a set of
propositions.

Glaser 1978, Strauss 1987, Strauss & Corbin
1989, Strauss and Corbin 1990, Glaser 1992,
Strauss & Corbin 1994, Glaser 1995, Glaser
1998).
As a well established method for
analysing qualitative data and generating
theory in other fields, it is perhaps not
surprising that there is increasing interest in
using GTM in IS. Dey (1999), drawing on
Creswell (1998) gives 12 characteristics of
GTM and these are shown in Table 1.
GTM is well signposted in the literature
which makes it attractive to new researchers,
as it does give very clear guidance on how to
code qualitative data, and table 1 gives some
indication of the extent of that guidance.
However, it should be noted that GTM is as
much about generating theory inductively as it
is about analysing data, though less used for
this in IS research thus far. The notion of
setting aside theoretical ideas is often to held
to imply that the researcher does not look at
existing literature, and GTM has been much
criticised for what is seen as a tabula rasa
approach, where the researcher is a ‘blank
slate’. However, Glaser and Strauss’s position
on this is actually less stringent than at first
glance. One challenge for IS researchers using
GTM is how to tailor this essentially inductive
research process to the more conventional, and
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deductive, presentation required in theses and
journal articles.
In the field of information systems
research, GTM has been used mainly, though
not exclusively, in interpretive research as
GTM is a useful way of analysing qualitative
data, irrespective of philosophical position.
Some examples from the past decade in IS
include Toraskar 1991, Orlikowski 1993,

CONTRIBUTION
This paper is both a reply to Bryant’s
(2002) article in JITTA on grounded theory
method, and an extension to the debate on
the use of GTM in IS. In particular, the
paper looks at the charges of positivism
levelled at GTM by Bryant’s article and
asks if they are firstly fair, and secondly, if
those charges matter.
The paper extends the debate by
examining the central paradox of GTM –
that it is an inductive method, founded on a
subjective process – the coding of data –
that claims to be a systematic, unbiased
method for generating theory. It also
suggests that IS researchers look closely at
whether they are using GTM simply as a
coding method, or as a method of
generating theory.
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Urquhart 1997, Urquhart 1998, Urquhart
1999a, 1999b, 2001b, Adams & Sasse 1999,
Baskerville & Pries−Heje 1999, and Trauth
2000 – most of these articles, but not all, are
interpretive research. GTM has been
increasingly described and debated as well as
more and more IS researchers discover the
method, and Howcroft & Hughes 2000,
Urquhart 2001a, are two examples of this
debate in IS. GTM has been widely debated in
other fields as well, as it is, after all, a method
of 35 years standing.
Antony Bryant’s (2002) article in
JITTA entitled ‘Re-Grounding Grounded
Theory’, is an example of the increasing reexamination of grounded theory method
(GTM) that is taking place in IS, as it is used
by increasing numbers of researchers to
analyse qualitative data. Bryant gives an
excellent assessment of grounded theory from
both a systems and ethnographic perspective.
He quite rightly points out that GTM needs to
be retrieved from its apparently positivist
origins – so far so good, especially as most of
the application of GTM in IS seems to be in
interpretive research. Unfortunately, he
neglects a large body of work in other fields
that debates precisely that point, and he makes
some sweeping claims about the nature of
GTM that beg for a reply. The concern here is
that overstated claims of GTM’s positivist
nature simply reinforce old prejudices about
GTM that bear little relation to how it is used
today in IS.
This article revisits some of the issues
raised in Bryant’s article, and extends the
debate by considering how the process of
coding in GTM contributes to the subjectivity,
or otherwise, of the method.
•

Firstly, this article re-examines the charge
of positivism made by Bryant, and
considers its importance for IS
researchers, given the prevalence of GTM
use in interpretive, rather than positivist,
IS research.

•

Secondly, the idea put forward in the
Bryant article that GTM applies the rule of
phenomenalism is discussed. As defined
by Giddens (1974), phenomenalism
asserts that only reality immediately
apprehended by the perceiver can be

classed as knowledge and this is part of
the philosophy of positivism. The issue
here is how this relates to the focus on
‘data’ in GTM and whether one is a
necessary precursor of the other.
•

Thirdly, the charge of ‘naïve Baconian
inductionism’ contained in the Bryant
article. This charge essentially relates to
the tabula rasa which some people think
GTM requires. This article examines that
charge and what the implications are for
IS researchers use of the literature when
using GTM.

•

Finally, this article extends the debate by
discussing the subjective nature of the
coding which is at the heart of GTM – and
asks the question, if coding is an
essentially subjective process, how
systematic a method of theory generation
can GTM actually claim to be?

GTM – QUALITATIVE METHOD IN
POST POSITIVIST CLOTHING?
GTM is paradoxical and unique – a
method for analysing qualitative data which
also claims to be a systematic way of
generating theory. For this reason alone, there
are bound to be debates about whether it is
positivist or interpretivist in nature. Certainly,
in the 1967 book, Glaser and Strauss make
great play of the systematic nature of their
method of theory generation, and there are
many positivist sounding statements in that
book. However, one has to consider the
historical context of the time; Discovery was
published at a time when many so-called softer
fields, such as sociology, were striving for
academic respectability and wanted to be seen
as ‘scientific’. Bryant makes the interesting
point that the central texts of GTM have been
almost silent on the issues of epistemology and
philosophy over the past 30 years, and that this
is surprising given the developments that have
taken place in these areas. While the central
texts may not have debated it much, many
people using it in other fields have done so. At
this point, we can also ask, why is it at all
necessary to debate whether GTM is positivist
or interpretivist in nature?
One key to why the debate is important
to interpretive IS researchers at least, is
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contained in the Klein and Myers (1999)
paper on principles for conducting interpretive
field research, where they state that researchers
should make the fundamental philosophical
assumptions of their research clear. Many
interpretive methods, such as ethnography,
phenomenology, and hermeneutics, have a
clear philosophical basis. In using the method,
one also accepts the accompanying
philosophy. So, for any interpretive researcher
using GTM, the challenge is to discover what
the philosophical foundations of GTM are, and
whether use of the method carries some
philosophical implications. Given that most of
the use of GTM seems to be by interpretive
researchers, it is important that the
philosophical position of GTM be debated.
One way of trying to get to the
philosophical basis of GTM is to look at the
background of the originators and their views.
As Bryant also points out, one of the
originators of grounded theory method,
Strauss,
comes
from
the
symbolic
interactionist
school
(Annells
1996),
something rarely remarked upon in
information systems literature. Symbolic
interactionism holds that the individual enters
their own experience only as an object, not a
subject, and that entry is predicated on the
basis of social relations and interactions (Mead
1962, in Annells 1996). This leads Annells
(1996) to place grounded theory within an
ontology of critical realism, as part of the postpositivist paradigm (Guba & Lincoln 1994).
Critical realism holds that there is one reality,
however imperfectly apprehendible (Guba &
Lincoln 1994). Annells (1996) points to
statements by Glaser (1992) about the classic
mode of grounded theory focusing on
‘concepts of reality’(p.14) and searching for
‘true meaning’(p.55) as evidence of a critical
realist position. It should be noted however,
that Glaser (1999) has said:
“In some quarters of research, grounded
theory is considered qualitative, symbolic
interaction research. It is a kind of takeover..”

Interestingly,
both
symbolic
interactionism and grounded theory have also
been claimed as interpretive approaches,
where the ontology is one of socially
constructed meaning systems which is based
on an internal experience of reality (Neuman
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1997). Grounded theory has also been linked
to philosophical hermeneutics which offer an
alternative
to empiricist and historicist
accounts of science (Thompson 1990). Strauss
and Corbin’s (1990) suggestion of a
conditional matrix, which incorporates
consideration of larger contextual issues of
historical, political and economic conditions,
can be seen to lean toward a relativist
approach (Annells 1996). Strauss (1987)
suggests that the researcher is actively
involved with the method, and again this can
be interpreted as a relativist statement
(Annells 1996). In contrast to the very post
positivist sounding ‘criteria and canons’ of
Strauss and Corbin (1990) for judging
grounded theory studies, Glaser (1992) states
that the criteria for judging a grounded theory
are ‘fit, work, relevance, modifiability,
parsimony and explanatory scope’. These
sound considerably closer to Guba and
Lincoln’s (1989) authenticity criteria for
constructivism, such as fairness and improved
understanding, than Strauss and Corbin’s
(1990) criteria. So, it seems that both Glaser,
Strauss, Strauss and Corbin, have at different
times, and sometimes simultaneously, leaned
toward
both
post
positivism
and
interpretivism. Madill, Jordan and Shirley
(2000) argue quite convincingly that the
philosophical position adopted when using
grounded theory depends on the extent to
which the findings are considered to be
discovered within the data, or as the result of
construction of intersubjective meanings. They
locate the former view as Glaser’s (1992)
position and the latter as Strauss and Corbin’s
(1990).
One of the enduring paradoxes of
grounded theory is that, above all it is an
inductive method and has been stated as so
from the very beginning (Glaser & Strauss
1967), and yet it is seen as a post positivist
method. Post positivism, like its predecessor
still places great value on deduction as a way
of discovering a research problem. Grounded
theory’s original aim was to inductively
generate formal theory, via the route of
substantive theory (that is, pertaining to a
particular area), in the field of sociology.
Glaser (1992) lays great stress on the
‘emergent’ nature of grounded theory method,
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and states that the data should not be ‘forced’
into conceptual categories. It is the inductive
and emergent nature of the method that seems
most at odds with an underlying ontology of
critical realism. Strauss and Corbin (1990) talk
of a ‘reality that cannot actually be known, but
is always interpreted’.
Bryant rightly says the characterisation
of grounded theory method, as proposed in
1967, is a product of the political and historical
context of the time. He says that it is surprising
that the founders, in the 1980s and 1990s, have
not engaged positivism with critiques. Why is
it surprising? The key to this lack is simply
that, GTM is, first and foremost, a method, and
indeed all the writings of the founders are
bound up with this concern, rather than
philosophical issues. Bryant himself is careful
to distinguish between grounded theory as a
possible outcome of using grounded theory
method, and the method itself.
It is probably appropriate to quote
Glaser (1999), who stated during a conference
address:
“Let me be clear. Grounded theory is a
general method. It can be used on any data or
combination of data.”

While it is clearly useful to consider the
philosophical baggage that any research
method might have, it may simply be that the
focus of grounded theory method, as a method
of analysing data, has precluded much
consideration of ontology or epistemology by
its founders. This gives rise to the varying
interpretations of others using the method
(Thompson 1990, Annells 1996, Madill et al
2000) as being simultaneously located in
relativism, hermeneutics and constructivism,
especially when it has been used by
researchers in other fields for over thirty years.
In information systems GTM has been
largely used within an interpretive context
(Toraskar 1991, Orlikowski 1993, Urquhart
1997, 1998a, 1999a, 1999b, 2001b,
Baskerville & Pries−Heje 1999, Trauth 2000)
but also more positivist ones (eg Adams and
Sasse 1999). One could argue that, as long as
IS researchers are clear about their own
philosophy, GTM can then be subsequently
located in any paradigm as a way of analysing
data.

Thus, it is questionable whether there is
an urgent need to retrieve GTM from its
positivist origins; this has been quietly
happening in IS for over a decade. Perhaps the
final word should go to Orlikowski and
Baroudi (1991), where they reference Glaser
and Strauss (1967) and GTM, as an example
of an interpretive viewpoint. They quote
Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) statement that the
primary endeavour is to describe, interpret,
and analyse the social world from the
participant’s perspective, and that all rigid a
priori researcher imposed formulations of
structure, function, purpose and attribution are
resisted (Glaser and Strauss 1967, in
Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). On the face of
it, this would seem a very interpretive way of
looking at the world and is contained in the
very first book ever written on grounded
theory method. So, since 1991, some
researchers in IS have seen GTM as an
interpretive method, concerned with analysing
the world from the participants perspective –
thus it provides a means to analyse participants
interpretations.
Bryant however does level some
serious charges at GTM, namely the ‘rule of
phenomenalism’ which is linked to valueneutral observations, and ‘naïve Baconian
inductionism’ (Haig 1995) which assumes the
researcher as a tabula rasa or blank slate,
going
into
the
field
without any
preconceptions. The next two sections
examine these charges in detail.

IS GTM GUILTY OF
PHENOMENALISM?
Bryant goes to some length to claim
that GTM is at heart phenomenalist. As
defined by Giddens (1974), phenomenalism
asserts that only reality immediately
apprehended by the perceiver can be classed as
knowledge, and this is part of the philosophy
of positivism. What Bryant seems to be saying
is that, because data is seen as an
unexceptional category and simply what is
observed, this points to a consistently positivist
and phenomenalist strand in GTM, especially
when the theory is ‘grounded in the data’.
One difficulty here is this – is the issue
the grounding in the ‘data’, or the use of the
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word ‘data’, or both? It is not clear why use of
the word data, or grounding in data, should be
positivist or phenomenalist. The waters are
muddied further when Bryant quotes Haig
(1995) who says that theories typically are
grounded in phenomena, not data. This only
serves to confuse, as the word data used in
GTM can be shown to be quite a broad term
and to cover some ‘phenomena’. Haig (1995)
does give a working definition of phenomena
(p.3) as a ‘varied ontological bag that includes
objects, states, processes and events and other
features which are hard to classify’. He
contrasts this with data which are in his view
are idiosyncratic to particular contexts (p.4).
However, Strauss (1987) points out that there
are many sources of data, and these are not
confined to observations. It is noteworthy that
GTM is also said to be good for studying
processes (Glaser 1978, Orlikowski 1993),
which in Haig’s (1995) view would fall into
the category of phenomena.
Haig then goes on to suggest that
theories in GTM should be grounded in
phenomena, not data. Yet the definition of
data provided by GTM suggests that at least
some of this ‘data’ is in fact phenomena in
Haig’s terms. GTM aims to build substantive
theories, meaning that the theory is particular
to the object of investigation only. This is
similar to the idea Haig puts forward about a
theory being grounded in data idiosyncratic to
particular contexts. One possible interpretation
of this is that, in Haig’s view, GTM should be
orientated to larger scale theories – relating to
his particular definition of phenomena.
Interestingly, Strauss (1987) takes much the
same line when he talks about substantive
theories shading into larger, more formal
theories.
Haig’s views – partially represented in
Bryant’s article and expanded on in this one,
can perhaps be seen as a sideshow with regard
to the charge of phenomenalism, albeit an
interesting sideshow. There is perhaps a
difference between Gidden’s view of
phenomenalism as represented by Bryant, and
Haig’s (1995) view of phenomena. In any
case, Haig seems much more concerned with
the theory generation side of things.
More importantly, Bryant’s claim that,
in GTM, data is seen as an unexceptional
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category and that it is simply what is observed,
needs to be challenged. The problem here is
that the process of theory generation in GTM
involves coding. Coding means that the data is
analysed and transformed into categories.
Most people would agree that coding, by its
very nature, is an inherently subjective
process. Therefore it is hard to see data as an
unexceptional category as Bryant claims, and
why this would contribute to a charge of
phenomenalism and positivism. Bryant also
raises the very same issue of subjectivity later
in his paper, when he rightly says that, stripped
of its scientific veneer, GTM is essentially
concerned with meaning construction. A key
question about GTM is whether two
researchers, given the same data and the same
research problem, would come up with the
same categories for their data. This
contradictory and somewhat paradoxical idea –
a systematic method for generating theory
(GTM) based on an essentially subjective
process (coding and induction) that can and
does have different results depending on the
researcher, is discussed later in the paper.
If the issue is that somehow it is not
possible for a theory to be ‘grounded in the
data’, or that to do so is somehow
phenomenalist, then there are many
interpretive users of GTM that would disagree.
For many researchers using GTM to analyse
qualitative data, the whole attraction of GTM
is precisely that close tie to the data. For any
conceptualisation that a researcher chooses to
make, the method of constant comparison
(which involves constantly comparing
instances of data labelled as a particular
category with other instances of data, to see if
these categories fit and are workable) can
provide many instances of that particular
conceptualisation. This produces rigorous
research, because any claim made will be
backed up by not one instance in the data, but
repeating instances. Moreover, because GTM
codes observations at a detailed level, the
concepts produced tend to be more substantial
than if one had done a ‘top down’ analysis and
picked broad themes from the data.
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THE CHARGE OF

NAÏVE
INDUCTIONISM AND THEORETICAL
SENSITIVITY

Bryant also makes much of Haig’s
(1995, p.2) charge of ‘naïve Baconian
inductionism’ in GTM. He also criticises
DeVreede et al (1999) paper, which uses GTM
in a cross cultural field study of GSS, for using
a form of inductionism that has been largely
discredited. He is also critical of De Vreede et
al’s lack of justification for being guided by
existing theories. These two issues are linked,
and are bound up with the way GTM is
wrongly perceived as not taking cognisance of
other theories and literature.
If we look carefully at Haig’s position,
he does in fact elaborate on what ‘naïve
Baconian inductionism’ is, by saying the
charge of naïve inductionism equates to the
way that
‘grounded theory is depicted as a tabula
rasa view of inquiry, which indefensibly
maintains that observations are not theory or
concept dependent’ (p.5).

Haig goes on to refute the charge of
‘naïve inductionism’ by pointing out that
Glaser and Strauss (1967) explicitly say that
‘the researcher does not approach reality
as a tabula rasa..[he or she] must have a
perspective in order to see relevant data and
abstract
relevant
categories
from
[it]’(emphases added).

The ‘tabula rasa’ idea, therefore, can be
seen as a corruption of the idea of theoretical
sensitivity (Glaser 1978). One of the tenets of
theoretical sensitivity is that the researcher
enters the research setting with as few
predetermined views as possible, especially
logically deducted, prior hypotheses (Glaser
1978). That said, theoretical sensitivity is
increased by being steeped in the literature and
associated general ideas (Glaser 1978), so that
a researcher will understand what a theory is.
Thus the idea of theoretical sensitivity can be
seen as an injunction against a deductive mode
of thinking rather than an injunction against
the literature or concepts per se.
(Glaser 1992, p. 31) further elaborates
by stating that theoretical sensitivity is:

An ability to generate concepts from
data and relate them to the normal models
of theory in general..
So, literature is used to help build the
theory, and the substantive theory related to
the literature, but only once the substantive
theory has been developed. According to
Glaser (1992, p. 31), the dictum in grounded
theory is that there is no need to review the
literature in the substantive area under study,
and that this idea is:
‘brought about by the concern that
literature might contaminate, stifle or
contaminate or otherwise impede the
researchers
effort
to
generate
categories..’
He hastens to add though, that this
applies only in the beginning, and that when
the theory is sufficiently developed, that the
researcher needs to review the literature in the
substantive field and relate that literature to
their own work (Glaser 1992).
Strauss’s (1987) opinion on the issue of
literature, was that the advice about delaying
the scrutiny of related literature applies full
force to inexperienced researchers, but less so
to experienced researchers who are already
good at subjecting a theoretical statement to
comparative analysis, and would question
whether it would hold ‘true’ under different
conditions. Strauss (1987) also says that, once
a grounded theory is developed, researchers
should grapple with other theories, and either
incorporate them or critique them.
So the position of DeVreede et al
(1999), in relating their theory to the TAM
model, does in fact have some support in the
grounded theory canon of literature. Bryant
makes an interesting point in questioning
whether the ‘cognitive evasion’ required by
this position is actually possible. Clearly the
founders of GTM saw it as a device to prevent
unoriginal, deductive and derivative thinking
about categories in the early stages of a theory,
but are also interested in how a grounded
theory might relate to other theories.
The ‘tabula rasa’ idea remains a
popular misconception about GTM, and can in
some cases make it difficult for IS researchers
to adopt the method. Postgraduate students in
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IS wishing to use the method can find
themselves restricted by a standard view of
research which assumes that a complete
literature search, and a very defined research
problem, comes before entering the field.
Similarly, the standard format of a journal
article puts literature before the study results,
implying that this is what happened, whereas
in practice the grounded theory user would do
the bulk of the literature searching afterward.
That said, there is nothing in the GTM
literature that specifically precludes looking at
relevant literature before entering the field, and
then conducting a further search in order to
relate the theory produced to the literature. The
thing to keep in mind is the purpose of the
injunction about delaying the literature search
– which is to produce categories that are not
influenced by concepts from the literature. If a
researcher produces categories that are
reminiscent of existing theories, this goes
against the emergent and inductive nature of
GTM. Worse, the researcher can end up
‘forcing the data’ (Glaser 1992) into
preconceived categories. In practice, a
researcher can refer to existing literature
before commencing data analysis, but should
be mindful – and check for – categories that
may have come from the literature.

THE PARADOX OF GTM – INDUCTIVE
AND EMERGENT AND SYSTEMATIC?
Bryant rightly identifies the problem
with GTM as it being offered in terms of both
a qualitative one, and also a good scientific
one (It is also what makes the debate so
interesting). An associated problem is that the
method has clearly evolved over the period of
35 years, so for every seeming positivist
statement by one founder, a correspondingly
interpretivist statement can be found by
another. As GTM has been used in the health
field for as many years, many contradictory
statements can be found in this stream of
research as well.
One could argue that the method itself
is paradoxical. When Glaser (1992) talks about
‘emergence’, his major concern is that the data
should speak to the researcher, rather than be
‘forced’ into categories. He criticises Strauss
and Corbin (1990) for being overly
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prescriptive and over concerned with
description and conceptualisation (this is the
essence of the famous ‘split’ between the co
founders in 1992). It seems that Glaser is
arguing for induction in its purest sense. Most
researchers who have used GTM will attest to
that ‘emergence’ – not necessarily a mystical
process, but one where one sees the data in an
entirely new way. Putting aside preconceptions
does result in original insights to the data, and
the method of constant comparison does
enable the researcher to understand their data
set and ‘ground’ the theory. So, as a process
GTM combines creativity and some rules to
enhance that creativity.
So, how does that creativity and
subjectivity stack up against the claim that
theory can be systematically generated?
Certainly, the advantage of GTM is that it has
well signposted procedures, reassuring to
novice researchers. More importantly, it
enables the researcher to demonstrate that a
particular coding procedure has been followed,
and this helps justify research. It is arguable
that all good research should be able to
demonstrate a chain of analysis, and GTM
helps in this regard.
With regard to how systematic GTM is,
Madill et al (2000) carry out an interesting
exercise when they examine what happens
when two researchers analyse the same data
set using GTM. Unsurprisingly, the analytic
categories generated by the two researchers
are different. Madill et al then analyse the
outcomes
from
realist,
contextual
constructionist, and radical constructionist
perspectives.
They conclude that, from a realist
perspective, the issue becomes one of level of
analysis, and that the categories can be
reasonably well integrated into themes. From a
contextualist
perspective,
researcher
subjectivity is the issue – and analytic style is
an aspect of this. Researchers would be
expected to identify different codes depending
on training and research interests. Thus,
researchers should articulate their position to
enable the reader to judge their analyses.
The radical constructionist perspective
would be concerned with the issue of reifying
subjectivity and underlying rhetorical devices
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that may exist in the text (Madill et al 2000).
What is interesting about this exercise is that
the degree of ‘subjectivity’ detected depends
entirely on the philosophical position of the
researcher using the coding method. Thus
Madill et al neatly separate out the coding
process of GTM from any accompanying
philosophy and then consider that coding from
the researchers own philosophical perspective.
So, how systematic the method is may be
entirely in the eye of the beholder and linked
more to philosophical position rather than any
rigour inherent in the method itself.
Madill’s approach of separating
research philosophy from the coding process
of GTM seems a much more reasonable way
of looking at GTM. Certainly, it has been used
in IS more as a coding method rather than a
research method imbued with a particular
philosophy. It is arguable that the take up of
GTM of IS in the past 10 years has much to
with it being a clearly explicated and well
respected method of coding qualitative data,
rather than a concern with building theories.
There are other approaches to coding, such as
using predetermined codes or taking a 'middle
order' approach (Dey 1993), where some
preliminary distinctions in the data are made.
Miles and Huberman’s (1994) chapter on
coding and analysing data also provides a
wider perspective on coding qualitative data
per se. Experience with using GTM shows that
it is essentially a ‘bottom up’ coding method.
Therefore, it is not unusual for researchers to
find that GTM gives them a low level theory
which they find difficult to ‘scale up’
appropriately.
One issue then, in our use of GTM in IS
is to clearly identify what we are using it for a)
a coding method, or b) a method of theory
generation. There is ample evidence in IS
literature for the first use, much less for the
second. One useful side effect of using GTM
in IS could be a much more detailed
consideration of the role of theory – and
generation of our own theories specific to IS.

CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to refute
some of the charges of positivism made of
GTM made by Bryant, and to extend the

debate further about the use of GTM by IS
researchers.
In dealing with the idea that GTM is
positivist (or indeed post positivist), we can
ask, does it matter that it is? The answer is
that, to interpretivist researchers, it does
matter, lest they import a philosophy along
with the method, that is at odds with their own.
What is interesting is that the founders
themselves seem to have leant in different
directions over the past 35 years, on this issue.
This is possibly because the focus is primarily
on the method, and the mechanics of analysing
data using the method. In other disciplines,
researchers seemed to have claimed GTM for
both interpretivism and positivism. How is this
possible? Partially because GTM is itself
paradoxical – a coding method (and coding is
of necessity subjective) that claims to generate
systematic theory. One pragmatic answer for
IS researchers is simply to use GTM as a
method, within their own philosophical bias.
As Bryant points out, GTM’s seemingly
positivist origins do not negate its use by
interpretive
researchers.
Bryant
notes
Orlikowki’s (1993) description of GTM as
inductive, contextual and processual, and this
is an excellent description of the strengths of
GTM.
At the same time, how exactly GTM is
being used by IS researchers should merit
more of our attention. At the moment, it seems
to be used much more as a coding method, as
distinct from a method of generating theory.
There is very little discussion in IS literature of
how theory might actually be generated using
GTM, and there is still not much in the way of
practical examples of coding. It is significant
that Glaser (2002) is now contributing to that
debate by writing about conceptualisation and
the need to distinguish between description
and analysis. There are a number of
implications for researchers in IS considering
using the method.
Firstly, researchers also need to be
aware that GTM, however respected as a
method, is not the only method of qualitative
coding of data available. Secondly, they need
to know that there are particular issues
associated with the detailed level of analysis
that GTM requires. Thirdly, IS researchers
need to carefully consider their use of the
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literature and how this fits into a conventional
research process. Fourthly, they need to
consider if they are intending to generate a
theory, or simply use GTM’s well defined
coding procedures.
Some researchers in IS have written
about the experience of using GTM, notably
Hughes and Howcroft (2000), and Urquhart
(2001a). What is required now is more
attention to the practical issues that are
presented whenever GTM is used as a method
of qualitative data analysis. At the moment, the
issue of theory generation in IS using GTM
seems largely unexplored.

As more IS researchers use the method,
more discussion of philosophical and practical
issues surrounding GTM will emerge. On at
least one point (if not on a number of points)
Bryant and this author are agreed – GTM has a
long and healthy future in IS, and is a viable
and useful qualitative research method. The
philosophy, practice, and the various uses and
abuses of GTM in IS are well worth debating.
In particular, we need to ask ourselves – is
GTM simply a useful and ‘respectable’ coding
method for qualitative data in IS, or are we
serious about using it as a method of theory
generation?
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